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I.

INTRODUCTION

This paper offers a perspective from psychology on Donald Langevoort's paper,
The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions.3 After briefly introducing my field, I will
address two themes, "tall steps" and "slippery slopes," then discuss avenues to explore for
the future, which I call learning curves, and offer a few conclusions. I leave the legal
implications of mergers and acquisitions ("M&A") to the other discussant, Joan Heminway.4
Much of my research in organizational psychology has focused on work groups
and their effectiveness. That research led me to the related field of organizational behavior
and, more recently, to behavioral economics. I have worked as a consultant to five CEOs
involved in decisions on mergers and/or acquisitions.

II.

KEY THEMES: TALL STEPS & SLIPPERY SLOPES

Langevoort's first major theme, "tall steps,"5 concerns the arguments to overcome
in making a convincing case for cognitive bias and psychological processes that undermine
rationality in decisions about M&A. The height of the steps reflects the difficulty of arguing
successfully against the "rational actor model"6 that dominates today's thinking in corporate
and securities law in favor of the "bounded rationality"7 described in psychology and related
fields.
A second theme, "slippery slopes," refers to the path that leads from psychological
processes that undermine rationality, such as overconfidence and hubris,8 to undesirable
outcomes for firms involved in M&A, including "excessive risk-taking and concealment of
those risks from investors."9
Paper presented at the Conference on Behavior and Business Law at the University of Tennessee College of
Law, October 2, 2010, in Knoxville, Tennessee.
1

Professor, Department of Psychology, Austin Peay Building #303, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 37916.
E-mail: esundstr@utk.edu.
2

See generally Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J.
BUS. L. 65 (2011) (exploring the relationship between psychology and corporate and securities law).
3

Joan MacLeod Heminway, A More Critical Use of Fairness Opinions as a Practical Approach to the Behavioral Economics
of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 81 (2011).
4

5

Langevoort, supra note 3, at 66.

6

Id. at 65.

See generally D. Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 697
(2003) (discussing decision-making processes). See also D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39
AM. PSYCHOL. 341 (1984).
7

8

Langevoort, supra note 3, at 70-71.

9

Id. at 78.

99

100

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 12

Understanding the elusive connections – specifically when and how psychological
processes create slippery slopes to adverse outcomes in M&A – could represent a third
theme, aptly summed up in a phrase from the title of one of Langevoort's recent papers:
"…chasing the greased pig."10
Recent findings from psychology and related fields suggest ways in which the
slopes can become slippery and ways to make the steps less tall. I will identify extensions
and questions for each of the four steps in turn. Briefly, the steps refer to: 1) situational
factors in biased, individual decision-making; 2) personality factors in irrational decisions; 3)
institutional features of organizations, including "de-biasing" influences; and 4) the
normative question – "so what?" – which may point toward interventions.
A.

Situational Factors in Biased, Individual Decision-Making

Recent research from behavioral economics may offer help with the first step by
identifying situational factors consistently related to sources of cognitive bias and enabling
more robust behavioral predictions than in the past. Dan Ariely's book Predictably Irrational11
reports several studies that found situational variables associated with sources of cognitive
errors, involving both distorted perceptions and biased decisions. For example, in the
"decoy effect," a form of perceptual anchoring, the presence of a higher-priced third option
made a medium-priced option more attractive than when it represented one of only two
options. Another experiment demonstrated an expectation effect, familiar in the psychology
of perception, in which individuals misperceived ambiguous events consistent with what
they expected. These and other studies summarized in Predictably Irrational point to
identifiable circumstances under which cognitive biases become relatively likely.
Evidence linking irrational decisions in organizations to situational factors comes
from a new study of corporate illegality published this year in ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT
JOURNAL, one of the top journals of management.12 Researchers predicted the greatest
illegality under conditions of high external expectations based on above-average stock
performance, and high "social aspirations" based on peer firms' financial performance. They
obtained reports of 469 incidents of corporate fraud, environmental violations, false claims,
and anti-competitive violations from 1990 through 1999. They also obtained records of
stock prices and returns on investments for the 194 S&P 500 firms involved. After
accounting for control variables based on firms' characteristics, results supported the
hypothesis linking corporate illegality with high social aspirations. The study also found,
only for prominent firms, the predicted correlation of corporate illegality with high
expectations based on abnormally high performance.
Recent work expands the list of sources of irrational decisions in organizations to
include what could be called "inferential bias." For example, a 2007 book by Phil
Rosenzweig13 describes eight "delusions that deceive managers," including the "halo effect,"
a familiar tendency to over-generalize evaluations to include attributes beyond those directly
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observed. Another inferential bias involves "the delusion of single explanations," or
attributing company performance to one factor instead of the multitude of factors likely
involved. Such faulty analysis of information about businesses, along with overinterpretation of media stories, could help lead to misperceptions of company value,
performance, future potential market share, and other key elements in M&A. Potential
sources of bias in individual decisions also include interpersonal influences, for instance in
relationships with co-workers, competitors, and customers. A review of research on
strategic decision-making in organizations identifies coalitions as a key source of influence.14
In sum, recent research from psychology reinforces the sources of cognitive bias
that Langevoort cited, and suggests others, including expectation effects, inferential bias, and
coalitions. However, this does little to change the bottom line for the first tall step.
Available evidence continues to point to predictable, situational influences that can increase
the likelihood of irrational individual decisions. When executives participating in decisions
about M&A find themselves in certain circumstances, the evidence suggests that they may
become more likely to make decisions with predictable irrationality.
B.

Personality Factors in Irrational Decisions

As for the second tall step, concerning the role of personality in irrational
decisions, Langevoort cites substantial evidence for two traits of executives related to
cognitive bias. The first, hubris, refers to a "winner's curse that arises out of any auction-like
setting because the winner will, by definition, have the most optimistic valuation of the asset
in question."15 The second, over-confidence, "leads to diminished risk perception"16 among
executives and other decision-makers.
Recent research on the so-called "dark side" of leadership points to other
personality traits of executives that may contribute to decisions associated with destruction
of value or failure in M&A. A classic article proposes that leaders' incompetence derives
more from having undesirable traits than from lacking desirable ones, and presents evidence
that dysfunctional qualities of leaders include tendencies to "blow up, show off, or conform
when under pressure."17
Traits associated with relatively poor performance by leaders in a recent empirical
study included: abrasiveness in interpersonal relationships; disorganization or inattentiveness
to detail and follow-through; and conflict avoidance.18 A possible example arose in the
merger of Chrysler and Daimler-Benz, in which Chrysler’s CEO, Eaton, arguably showed all
three of these traits.19 Eaton made a series of questionable, individual decisions, apparently
after little consultation with the executive team. The critical decision to start a joint venture
14
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with Daimler-Benz (making parts for BMW) contradicted well-founded objections by a
knowledgeable, senior executive at Chrysler. How Eaton's personality influenced decisions
in the failed merger remains unknown, but begs the question: What personality traits foster
irrational individual decisions by leaders, through what dynamics? The "dark side" research
points to traits that could contribute to biased decisions and/or isolate or alienate a leader
from advisors who might clarify the options and their consequences.
Another recent, empirical study in the computer industry offers some limited clues
about the potential role of dark side personality traits of CEOs in acquisitions.20 Among 105
firms, a composite observational index of each CEO’s narcissism correlated significantly
with both the number and size of acquisitions by the firm, and with the extremity of
fluctuations in return on assets and total shareholder returns, from 1992 through 2004.
However, firm revenues correlated positively with CEO narcissism.
In brief, recent research from psychology adds evidence linking biased decisions
with personality traits other than hubris and over-confidence, and points to interpersonal
dynamics that might isolate leaders from advice that could counter cognitive bias. This
research seems to make Langevoort's second step in the case for irrational decisions less tall.
C.

Institutional Factors, Individual Decisions, & Corporate Decisions

The third step in a convincing argument for irrational individual decision-making
concerns characteristics of institutions as organizations, which can mitigate or magnify the
impact of individual, cognitive biases. Langevoort points out that important, corporate
decisions tend to involve not just individual executives, but multiple decision-makers in
sequential processes, often including group collaboration.21 Such institutional processes
affect whether, and how, an executive's biased decision as an individual translates into a
decision for the firm. Langevoort accurately notes that "psychology itself stops being
concretely helpful once we pass small group behavior"22 to examine such institutional
factors.
Psychologists of the 1970s did offer a general theory about the interfaces of
individuals with organizations, focused on roles (specific, behavioral expectations of
individuals in particular combinations of specialty and rank in a hierarchy of authority) and
systems comprised of those roles.23 The systems theory of organizations by Katz and Kahn
incorporated empirical evidence, available at the time, concerning features of organizational
structure and process linking individual behavior to organizational outcomes.24
The systems approach to organizations continued to develop after the 1970s – not
in psychology, but in the emerging field of organizational behavior, where a huge and
growing literature of empirical findings25 and theory26 has accumulated about the structure,
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processes, and design of organizations. Langevoort cites a source from this literature
describing collective "de-biasing factors"27 that potentially reduce or eliminate cognitive bias
in individual decision-making. These factors refer to informal rules and routines as well as
formal procedures, like assigning someone the role of devil's advocate, which may or may
not fit with an executive's role, the norms of the executive team, or the organization's
culture.
Applying systems theory to understand decision-making in M&A calls for a focus
on the CEO’s role in the organization's structure. Public descriptions of their roles by a few
CEOs point to the potential complexity and variety of expectations their role can include. 28
A study in large private-sector firms reported differences in many features of the CEO's
role.29 Related questions concern the size, composition, reporting relationships, and
practices in the executive team, as well as the role(s) of advisor(s) and consultant(s) to the
CEO.
Similarly critical to corporate decisions is the role of the board of directors
("BOD"). Current research points to wide variation in BOD sizes, compositions,
proportions of outside directors, structural features, processes, CEO interfaces, and
relationships of these factors with firm performance.30 The research offers few clues about
the influence of the BOD in the pathways from executive decisions to critical corporate
decisions, but does raise some questions. For example: Can smaller, more independent
BODs exert more effective oversight? And, to what extent does CEOs' influence on BODs'
processes diminish the effectiveness of BOD oversight, and allow cognitive biases to affect
firms' decisions? Other questions also arise.
The potential for organizational features to counter individual cognitive bias in
corporate decision-making does nothing to change the facts about irrational decisions by
firms.31 Langevoort cites persuasive evidence that many M&A decisions have injured
shareholders' interests and destroyed value in the organizations involved. Institutional
factors obviously did not "de-bias" these decisions, and pose no obstacle to Langevoort's
third step in the case for irrational decision-making. Institutional features do, however,
present avenues for intervention toward effective decision-making, which is the fourth step.
D.

The Normative Question: A Basis for Intervention?

In addressing the normative question about irrational M&A decisions – "So what?"
Langevoort considers the prospects for legal interventions involving regulation as a vehicle
for improved decisions, and arrives at no definite answer. A psychologist's perspective
involves different vehicles for intervention: organization structure and design; organization
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culture and learning; executive team composition, design, and development; leadership role
definition and clarification; executive consultation and coaching; and management education
and training. My remaining questions ask, how best to intervene, and with what urgency?
From the psychologist's perspective, sound intervention requires foundation in
scientific knowledge, reflecting a so-called "scientist-practitioner approach."32 As outlined in
Langevoort's analysis, and in my comments, current knowledge points to a variety of
psychological, interpersonal, and organizational processes that can prompt irrational
decisions by individual executives and others that allow or promote their translation into
flawed corporate decisions. If these processes place executives, their teams, and their
organizations on slippery slopes, they present learning curves at least as steep.

III.

LEARNING CURVES AHEAD

Executives responsible for leading today's organizations face three sets of learning
curves for effective decision-making: individual, team, and organizational. The ones for
individuals are most clearly defined and thoroughly studied.
A.

Individual Learning Curves

A review of 50 years of research on individual decision-making33 suggests that
today's decision makers are receptive to learning to improve their decisions. The review
identifies many sources of cognitive bias and evaluates approaches to learning to avoid them.
The authors distinguish two decision processes: "System 1 refers to our intuitive system,
which is typically fast, automatic, effortless, implicit, and emotional; System 2 refers to
reasoning that is slower, conscious, effortful, explicit, and logical."34 For executives involved
in M&A decisions, relevant learning involves both of these processes. Intuitive processes
can reflect hubris-related errors, like overvaluing assets; expectancy errors, like perceiving
only what was anticipated; and so on. Deliberative processes, like applying pricing
algorithms, can incorporate perceptual errors along with other kinds of mistakes, such as
overlooking available options, omitting data sources, over-estimating accuracy of
information, etc.35
After 25 years of research on training in decision-making, the evidence suggests
that only one approach has yielded more than "minimal success, and even intensive,
personalized feedback produced only moderate improvements in decision making."36 This
result carries two implications for executive learning curves: 1) individual effectiveness calls
for personal learning from intensive, personalized feedback (the individual learning curve);
and 2) effective decision-making for the organization involves at least multiple collaborators
(group or team decisions) and possibly organizational processes.
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Team Learning Curves

For the senior leadership groups most critical to corporate decisions about M&A,
the CEO's executive team and the BOD, the relevant learning curve concerns teamwork in
general, and effective group decision-making in particular. To the extent that these groups
consciously decide to collaborate as teams,37 they can draw on a huge research literature for
guidance.38 The research suggests, among other things, that teams who actively work toward
collective learning, and who introduce specific improvements in their interaction processes
in nine specific areas, can improve their performance.39 My experience similarly suggests
that executive teams and BODs, who take time to explicitly evaluate their own teamwork,
and to openly discuss how to improve it, can avoid many of the pitfalls that Langevoort
describes.
C.

Organization Learning Curves?

Can entire organizations learn collective processes for effective decisions? We have
a limited basis for optimism that organizations can achieve synergy in decisions about
M&A.40 As for processes of organizational change after a merger or acquisition, the research
literature on organizational behavior and theory has much to offer.41 How well the
organizations of the future can assimilate and apply this rapidly expanding knowledge
remains to be seen.

IV.

CONCLUSIONS

Three conclusions follow from this review of 1) sources of cognitive bias in
executive decision-making, 2) the "slippery slope" to flawed corporate decisions, and 3)
adverse outcomes for firms involved in M&A and their shareholders. First, recent research
from psychology adds to the already ample basis for Langevoort's persuasive argument
against the "rational actor model" in favor of bounded rationality in decision-making.
Second, we need better maps of the boundaries of irrational influences on decision-making,
their underlying processes, and institutional features that can mitigate them. Third, for
today's executive leaders and their organizations, the boundaries on rationality point toward
learning curves at least as steep as the slippery slopes on the way to effective decisionmaking in the future.
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